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Abstract
This paper studies the question of entry in the circular city model when the pre−entry market
structure involves local monopolies. In contrast with Salop (1979), we show that the unit
profit rate of incumbent monopolists is strictly positive and bounded above. The upper bound
decreases with the size of gaps and with the number of incumbents.
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In horizontal di¤erentiation models, under the assumption of costless reloca-
tion of …rms upon entry, the free entry outcome is usually characterized by a
zero-pro…t condition (Salop, 1979; McLeod, Norman and Thisse, 1988; Econo-
mides, 1989; Norman and Thisse, 1996). However, the existence of long run
spatial monopolists has not been studied seriously in the literature, since most
of the papers are restricted to market structures where incumbents e¤ectively
compete for their marginal consumers (covered market structures).
In this paper, we study the question of entry in the circular city model
when the pre-entry market structure involves local monopolies. As we show,
the di¢culty in analyzing local monopoly market structures under free entry
stems from the fact that gross monopoly pro…ts do not depend on the total
number of active …rms. Hence, the number of local monopolists that deter en-
try cannot be simply derived by applying a zero-pro…t condition and a detailed
analysis of entry must be carried out. To this aim, we de…ne the Symmetric
Local Monopolist Equilibrium (SLME) and we compare it with the monopoly
Symmetric Zero-Pro…t Equilibrium (SZPE) of Salop (1979).
Our results are the following. We …rst establish that a monopoly market
structure candidate for SLME exists for every value of the structural para-
meters of the model. In contrast both with the situation of restricted entry
and with the monopoly SZPE, the unit pro…t rate of incumbent monopolists
is positive and bounded above in equilibrium. The upper bound we …nd de-
creases with the size of unserved market areas (gaps) and with the number of
incumbent monopolists.
2M o d e l a n d d e … n i t i o n s
Consumers are di¤erentiated with respect to their location on the circum-
ference of a circle ¤ of unit length, with uniform density, normalized to 1.
Transportation cost along the circle is linear in distance, at rate t per unit
of good. The reservation price of consumers in the di¤erentiated industry is
constant and equal to v>0.W h e n n … r m sa r ea c t i v ei nt h ed i ¤ e r e n t i a t e d
product market, …rm i’s (i =1 ;:::;n) location is denoted by xi 2 ¤.
For any list of prices pi’s (i =1 ;:::;n) quoted by the di¤erentiated …rms,
the consumer located at point x 2 ¤ determines his preferred brand and buys
one unit of this brand only if he obtains a surplus greater than the outside




i=1;:::;nv ¡ pi ¡ tjx ¡ xij
¸
(1)
Production entails a …xed cost F and a variable cost proportional to the
quantity produced, which we normalize, without loss of generality, to zero.
Though the number of all candidates for incumbency is potentially large,
1economies of scale ensure that only a bounded number of …rms can break
even on the market.
Monopoly pricing in the horizontal di¤erentiation model is de…ned as fol-
lows. When a pro…t-maximizing …rm alone on a ‘large’ di¤erentiated mar-
ket sets a price p, its market radius is equal to x =( v ¡ p)=t and pro…ts
are ¦=2 ( v ¡ p)p=t. The monopoly price is therefore pm = v=2.I t l e a d s
to a monopoly market area of Dm = v=t and to monopoly (gross) pro…ts of
¦m = v2=2t.
With a …xed number of …rms, non-cooperative pricing can lead to non
covered market structure in the circular city (monopoly market structures
with gaps). For, when it leads to market shares that do not overlap, the
monopoly price is clearly an equilibrium of the price game.1 With n equally
spaced …rms on a circular market of unit size, a monopoly market structure
with gaps obtains when Dm = v=t · 1=n. In the rest of the analysis, we
denote by d =1 =n ¡ v=t ¸ 0 the size of the gaps.
C a nam o n o p o l ym a r k e ts t r u c t u r ew i t hg a p sm a i n t a i nw h e ne n t r yi sf r e e ?
The SZPE concept is ill-suited to answer this question. The reason is that,
contrary to competitive (or kinked) pro…ts, monopoly gross pro…ts do not de-
pend on the number of other active …rms around the circle. To circumvent this
di¢culty, we de…ne the SLME concept as follows.
De…nition 1 A Symmetric Local Monopolists’ Equilibrium (SLME) is any
monopoly market structure which satis…es the two conditions: (i) incumbents
make non negative pro…ts and (ii) no further entrant perceives the possibility
of at least breaking even on the market.
When checking for (ii), potential entrants’ anticipations on the post-entry
market equilibrium is crucial. We assume that capital is perfectly mobile so
that incumbents always relocate upon entry to form a symmetric structure
with the entrant. Concerning the price equilibrium, we assume that prices
adjust immediately in case of entry.2
3 Non covered markets under free entry
3.1 Existence of a candidate SLME
Consider a pro…table monopoly market structure with n …rms. With costless
relocation, entry is blockaded if the pro…t per …rm in the market structure
with n+1equally spaced …rms is below the …xed cost. A necessary condition
for this is that the post-entry structure does not consist of local monopolists
itself. After relocation of incumbents, the entrant has ‘free access’ to the total
mass nd of previously unserved consumers. For entry to be blockaded, it must
1Monopoly pricing is then a dominant strategy for …rms, at least locally (see the discus-
sion in Novshek, 1980).
2This implies that prices in the pre-entry structure have no entry deterring e¤ect.
2thus be the case that n:d < Dm. Combining this with the ex ante monopoly
condition d ¸ 0, we can therefore restrict the analysis to:
t
v




Let us assume, for the rest of the paper, that t=v ¸ 1, so that the total
market is large enough for at least one spatial monopolist. For …xed v and
t, there exists exactly one integer n that satis…es equation (2). When v and
t vary, n varies from one (the spatial single monopolist) to in…nity. Since
incumbents cannot make binding location decisions, it is not surprising to
…nd only one monopoly market structure candidate for SLME for every value
of the structural parameters of the model.3 The important result is that,
independently of F,w eh a v ea tl e a s to n ec a n d i d a t eS L M Ef o re v e r ys e to f
parameters values.
We analyze separately the cases of a single spatial monopolist and of
monopoly market structures with at least two …rms. The reason for this dis-
tinction is that it is only in the latter case that relocation of incumbents upon
entry plays a role.
3.2 The SLME with at least two …rms
We assume that t=v ¸ 2, so that the integer n which satis…es equation (2) is





Condition (2) then rewrites
t
t + v
· ®(n +1 )· 1 (4)
When ®(n+1)=t=(t+v), the size of the uncovered market d is zero, whereas
when ®(n +1 )=1 , the uncovered market area d reaches its maximum value
compatible with relocation of incumbents, Dm=n.
The question that arises now is the nature of the post-entry price equilib-
rium: it can be either kinked or competitive. Recall from Salop that the price












3The structural parameters are v, t and the total market size, which is normalized to
one.
3Lemma 1 The post-entry price equilibrium is never competitive when the pre-
entry monopoly market structure has at least two …rms.
Proof. By equation (6), the price equilibrium with n+1…rms is competitive
when n ¸ 3t
2v¡1.S i n c en · t
v by (2), a competitive post entry price equilibrium
can only occur when 3t
2v ¡ 1 < t
v, or equivalently, t
v < 2,ac a s ew er u l e do u t .
The driving force behind this result is the aggregation of all unserved con-
sumers due to the relocation of …rms in the post-entry structure. The costless
relocation assumption thus softens post-entry price competition, and leads to
the kinked equilibrium. As we shall see, this relocation e¤ect does not appear
in the single spatial monopolist case.
By de…nition, the kink equilibrium price is such that the marginal consumer
of the representative …rm is indi¤erent between buying the brand of this …rm,
buying the closest neighboring brand and not buying in the di¤erentiated in-
dustry. The post entry price is thus equal to:
p











2(n +1 ) 2 (8)
After some calculations, the condition for blockaded entry, ¦k · F,w r i t e s :
F
¦m ¸ ®(n + 1)(2 ¡ ®(n +1 ) ) (9)
Equation (9) de…nes, for any value of ®(n +1 )between t=(t + v) and 1,a
lower bound on the ratio F=¦m. This lower bound is a quadratic function of
®(n +1 ) ,w h i c hi se q u a lt ot(t ¡ 2v)=(t + v)2 at ®(n +1 )=t=(t + v) and
monotonically increases up to its maximum 1 attained at ®(n +1 )=1 .
In the rest of the paper, we denote by nM the integer that satis…es equation
(2), i.e., the integer part of t=v. We present our results using the Unit Pro…t
Rate (UPR) for spatial monopolists, represented by the ratio (¦m ¡ F)=F.
The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 1 When t ¸ 2v, there exists exactly one market structure candi-
date for SLME, with a number of …rms equal to nM ¸ 2. The monopoly market
structure with nM …rms is a SLME if and only if the UPR of local monopolies





1 ¡ ®(nM +1 )
i2
®(nM +1 )[ 2¡ ®(nM +1 ) ]
(10)
where ®(:) is given by (3).
4Equation (10) is simply obtained by rearranging equation (9) and by setting
n = nM. Finally, a SLME exists under two conditions: (i) gaps must be
positive and below the size of the monopoly market areas and (ii) pro…tability
of spatial monopolies cannot be to high in order to deter entry. Using Eq. (10),










Observe that the pro…tability of spatial monopolists is not limited when entry
is restricted: for given v and t, (¦m ¡F)=F goes to in…nity as F goes to zero.
3.3 The case of the single spatial monopolist
Let us assume now that the only integer that satis…es equation (2) is nM =1 .








The post-entry structure then consists of two equally spaced …rms, each having
am a r k e ts i z eo f1=2. By applying equation (5) and equation (6) with n =2 ,
we can show the following result.
Lemma 2 The post-entry price equilibrium is competitive when 3
4 · v
t · 1




The intuition behind Lemma 2 is clear. When the total size of the market
is close to the monopoly market area, competition is …erce in the post entry
structure, whereas when the size of the gap is close to the monopoly market
area, post-entry competition is less intense and leads to a kinked equilibrium.
When the post-entry structure is competitive, the price equilibrium is pc =
t=2 and the pro…t per …rm is ¦c = t=4 (see Salop, 1979). The condition for
blockaded entry, ¦c <F , de…nes then a minimum value for the …xed cost
equal to F min = t=4. The maximum value for the UPR of the single spatial






t2 ¡ 1 (13)
The case when the post entry equilibrium is kinked can be analyzed as in
section 3.2. When the gap is large, we thus have a bound on the UPR which







4Observe that this expression depends only on v and t.
5Observe that the change from the cases of competitive and kinked post-entry
market structures is continuous: at v=t =3 =4, equation (13) and equation
(14) both give a maximum UPR equal to 1/8. The following proposition
summarizes our result.
Proposition 2 (the case of the single spatial monopolist) Let v and t satisfy
equation (12), so that the only candidate SLME has nM =1 . A SLME with
exactly one …rm exists if and only if the UPR of the incumbent monopolist is
bounded above by equation (13) when 3
4 · v





4 Discussion of the results
The SLME is very di¤erent from the monopoly SZPE of Salop. First, a SLME
exists for every value of the parameters v and t, whereas the monopoly SZPE
exists only when v =
p
2tF. As we have already mentioned, this de…ciency of
the monopoly SZPE concept comes from the fact that gross and net pro…ts
of spatial monopolists do not depend on the total number of …rms in Salop’s
analysis. By carefully examining the post entry market structure, we are able
to solve this problem and to relate the number of spatial monopolists that can
operate under free entry to their net pro…tability.
The SLME has also more economic content than the monopoly SZPE. First,
for a given number of …rms nM, the pro…tability of incumbent monopolists is
explicitly linked with the size of the uncovered market areas. From equations
(10), (13) and (14), we can derive the following property (see Figure 1):
Corollary 1 For …xed nM, the larger the gaps are, the smaller is the maximum
UPR for incumbent monopolists. When gaps reach their maximum value (d =
Dm=nM), local monopolists must operate with zero pro…ts to deter entry.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
When we let nM vary, a second relation between product proliferation and
the maximum UPR of local monopolists obtains. Consider for this the upper
b o u n do nt h eUPR as a function of the number of …rms at the SLME with no







The right hand side of equation (15) is decreasing in nM and goes to zero as
nM goes to in…nity. Since, from Corollary 1, the upper bound on the UPR
at the SLME with no gaps is the maximum pro…tability in a SLME with nM
…rms, we can derive the following property.
6Corollary 2 (the happy few spatial monopolists) The maximum UPR for in-
cumbent monopolists decreases as nM increases. At the limit, when nM goes
to in…nity, monopolists operate with zero pro…ts.
We thus have a second link between the number of incumbents and their
maximum pro…tability.5 The intuition behind this result is that relocation of
incumbents upon entry gives the entrant access to a total mass of previously
unserved consumers which is increasing in nM.T h u st h el a r g e rnM,t h em o r e
likely it is that entry is pro…table. For very large nM, even for very small gaps,
this relocation e¤ect dominates and net pro…ts must go to zero in order to
deter entry.
Table 1 illustrates the result of the ‘happy few spatial monopolists’. The
relatively important decrease in pro…tability when nM changes from 1 to 2
again comes from the fact that relocation plays a role only when nM ¸ 2.
[Insert Table 1 here]
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Table 1: Maximum Unit pro…t Rate (UPR) and number of …rms at the SLME
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